

Exemplary are mentioned here: The reconnaissance of a threatening development of the situation in the East As evidenced by the lecture note of July 24, 1940 (Document III.66), clarified with the current reconnaissance results in August 1940, other essential information about the continued buildup of the Red Army (for example: Increase in the number of aircraft of the Red Army Air Forces to 12,000 to 14,000, increase in the number of Red Army divisions in the border military districts from 116 to 120) and other information was available, which was recorded in the August 1940 clarification of the above-mentioned lecture note and in the 09 September 1940 information of the Foreign Armies East. The then Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop recorded this development in the East in his notes as follows: quote 111.62 "In the spring of 1940, the Führer received news of increasing Soviet Russian troop deployments along the border of East Prussia, in Poland, and in Bessarabia. According to this information, there were to be 22 Soviet divisions in front of East Prussia alone, and 30 Russian corps in Bessarabia." 132 This report was again confirmed by Jodi during the cross-examination before the International Court of Nuremberg. Jodi stated: Quote IIL63 "The occasion was a report from Canaris, who reported the deployment of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia." 133 In Part I of the study "Germany in Stalin's Sight," the author presented in detail the escalation of a situation in the East that was becoming increasingly threatening to Germany and proved, on the basis of excerpts from the war diaries, that this development was being reconnoitered and closely observed by the Wehrmacht. 134 The developments that had become visible in the Baltic states The intensive continuation of the establishment of Red Army military bases in the Baltic countries, which began as early as 1939, the inclusion of Lithuania in the Russian sphere of interest forced by Stalin with the secret additional protocol of September 28, 1939, 135 and the military expansion of these countries on June 15-17, 1940, had already aroused serious fears on the German side. The rigorous elimination of the existing regimes, as well as the immediately following incorporation of the occupied Baltic countries as Union republics of the USSR ("applications" of Lithuania on August 03, Latvia on August 05, and Estonia on August 06, 1940; Law of the Union of August 06, 1940) and their sovietization, which began on August 25, 1940 (adoption of the new constitutions) 136 showed the danger from the East, which was growing for the German Reich to a special degree. This became clearly visible above all through the recognized massing of Red Army units on the borders to East Prussia. The entries in the war diaries "... Estonia: New demands from Russia " 137 of July 5, 1940, and the note of the naval warfare command "Soon further advance of Russians feared. Objective: Bolshevization in the Baltic States", also dated July 5, 1940, testify to the intensive observation of these events by the German high commands and the rapid and ruthless development in the East as well as the resulting fears for the German Reich. Goebbels also recorded in his diary on 09 August 1940: Quote IIL64 "We are talking about the Baltic states, where the Russians are unfolding a reign of terror. But we need not feel sorry for them and without intelligence they are less dangerous for us than with. Russia will always stay away from us. We can see that also in the Moscow newsreels. We must build an insurmountable wall between Moscow and us. Bolshevism is the world's number one enemy, and we will clash with it at some point. The Führer thinks so, too. " 139 Although the antagonistic contradiction to the ideology of the Soviet Union is visible in the diary note, this formulation, however, indicates more a planned shielding against the East than a planned "military invasion" of the Soviet Union. When the editor says in note 128: "Hitler apparently concealed his plans for the East from Goebbels," one can only hope that he did not believe this himself. Rather, at this point in time in August 1940, Hitler had not yet made any decision at all, but, as the following documents also prove, it was actually about the erection of an "insurmountable wall" in the form of a secure defense in the East. Even Molotov understood that the Sovietization of the Baltic states was a very serious provocation for Germany. He said: If the German government had swallowed the occupation of the Baltic states, it would also have to digest the incorporation of these

countries into the Soviet Union. "140 At the VI Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 01, 1940, Molotov made the following statement on the Baltic question: Quote III.65 "The primary significance for our country, however, possesses the fact that now the borders of the Soviet Union will be carried forward to the shores of the Baltic Sea. Thus our country gains its own ice-free harbors on the Baltic Sea, which we need so much. "141 The associated facilitated access of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet to the eastern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, i.e., a more dominant role of the USSR on the northern flank, were the results of this development. Developments against Finland On August 12, 1940, a whole series of reports on the concentration of Russian troops on the border with Finland were received by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The minutes recorded: "Whole series of embassy, attache, V. man messages about reinforcement of the 15 Russian divisions standing on the Finnish border by tank units. Alarm of these troops to be expected from 15.8. "142 Developments in the Balkans On 23 June 1940, a telegram from the German ambassador in Moscow informed the Reich government that the Soviet Union intended to demand that Romania cede Bessarabia. 143 Despite German protests, the cession of northern Bukovina, inhabited predominantly by Germans, was forced by the Soviet Union, even though it was not part of the Soviet sphere of interest by virtue of the secret agreement of August 23, 1939, and had never belonged to the Russian Empire in the past. Hitler was very surprised by this action of the Soviet Union and perceived this as Stalin's intensified push to the West. This small selection from the multitude of reports available to the political and military leaderships of the Third Reich demonstrate the need for a secure defense of the eastern borders. August 1940 The update of the lecture note of 24 July 1940 of the Foreign Armies East on "Russia" The assessment of the correction of the lecture note on "Russia" with the latest reconnaissance information of August 1940 1. This document is the verbatim reproduction of the lecture note on "Russia" of 24 July 1940 (obviously a transcript) with the aim of entering the clarifications and the latest findings in preparation for the information on the "Soviet Union" of 09 September 1940. Since the document was only signed by Kinsel, it must be assumed that he himself or a staff member on his behalf made the handwritten clarifications and thus established the initial data for the following information of 09 September 1940, but that this document was not delivered to the troops. 2 However, these precisions prove the rapid growth of knowledge about the threat situation in the East and the fact that the Wehrmacht had recognized it despite some misjudgments. An outstanding change was the substantial increase in the number of aircraft of the Red Army Air Forces from 5,000 in the lecture note for Halder of July 24, 1940, to now 12,000 to 14,000 aircraft and, as particularly threatening, the penetration depth of 1,500 km of the heavy bomber formations again mentioned. Noteworthy was also the increase of the total strength of the Red Army to 200 calculation divisions. 07 August 1940 The directive "Aufbau Ost" of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht; the development of the infrastructure in the East By the established historiography, this directive is considered unilaterally only as a determination to build such an infrastructure, which should enable the deployment for an "invasion" of the Soviet Union. The directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army for Army High Command 18 to be deployed to the east, dated June 29, 1940 (Document IIL27), read, "A. O.K. 18 is 'responsible for securing the eastern border against Russia and Lithuania.' "To this end, it was stipulated that enemy forces should be brought to a halt in such a way that they could be attacked after reinforcements had been brought in. In case of an attack, reinforcements were planned, which had to be unloaded, the supply of troops had to be ensured, and so on. In fulfillment of this order, on July 09, 1940, the decision report of the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army was submitted. It is therefore not surprising that on 11 July 1940 Gehrke reported to Halder on the planning and execution of the extension of the unloading network: "In the east, by the end of July, the documents will be in place for the improvement of the unloading network that I have requested; then shift of the construction troops to the east. In the Reich, ongoing

improvement work is in progress. "In order to prevent a misinterpretation of this entry, the editor of the war diary has

noted in note (1) the following: "For troop shifts in order to be able to strengthen security in the east.

"145 The task set for the 18th Army of bringing enemy forces to a halt, i.e., defending itself, also explains why Halder, in a consultation with Buhle on 20 July 1940, dealt with the problem: "East Prussia and the General Government: border questions and border guard." and on 27 July 1940, according to his entry in the war diary, "Wüstefeld: Abschlussgraben SS an Russischer Grenze

Fortifications Ostpreußens, Grenzfluss oder west

abgesetzt" ", with questions of expanding defenses. The July 26, 1940 by Fellgiebel to Halder reported

"Supplement Ostnetzes at present not possible. ", since the eastern cable had to be provided for

"Seelöwe" (Cf. I. Chapter.), proves that "Seelöwe" still had priority over the east at that time. 148 It was

not until after the discussion note submitted by Kinzel on July 24, 1940 (Document III.43) on

developments in the East, the contents of which must have worried every general staffer, Halder on 28

July 1940 made the following serious consideration, documented in the war diary, of strengthening

eastern security in the event of an attack by the Red Army: "Eastern deployment questions: 12

deployment-road links, 14 railroad deployment links including Slovakia. "^ Since Hitler did not

comment on his possible intentions until 31 July 1940, it is documented that Halder, virtually without

Hitler's instruction, decided as early as the end of June/beginning of July 1940 to take measures to

improve the infrastructure in East Prussia and the Generalgouvernement in recognition of a situation

that might come to a head in the east, as was his responsibility as Chief of the Army General Staff. Thus,

both the timing of the actions and the tasks assigned to the 18th Army in the east prove that the

incipient development of infrastructure in the east was unrelated to the Wehrmacht's buildup for an

"invasion" of the Soviet Union as claimed by established historiography. On 01 August 1940, the

evaluation of Hitler's consultation with the supreme commanders of the Wehrmacht components of 31

July 1940 was carried out by the chief of the Wehrmacht Leadership Office (As already presented

above.). In the War Diary of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, the tasks for the East resulting

from this consultation (citation in.67) are summarized as follows: Citation III.67 7. camouflage order for

the Aufbau Ost. 8. collection of documents for a draft order for preparations of longer duration (betr.

preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union). 150 On 02 August 1940, Chief L submitted to

the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht a draft order for Aufbau Ost, the broad

outlines of which were confirmed by the latter and then further elaborated. 151 Halder's entry of 04

August 1940 " Ostbefestigungen: Decision of questions posed by Wkdo 1 on expansion in terms of

offensive defense of German border. "152 confirms once again the focus of operational planning in the

summer of 1940, and thus also the objective of the Aufbau Ost directive, to counter the dangerous

situation developing in the east by offensive defense. Also, the "Expansion of Eastern Defenses" along

the Baltic coast ordered by the Seekriegsleitung on 02 August 1940 was clearly a matter of rebuilding

defenses that had been moved to the coasts of Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France during the

Wehrmacht's Western campaign: It states, "The following measures are ordered: a) Restoration by sea

and air of the defenses hitherto existing in peacetime and intended for the event of war; b) Protection of

the newly won area of the Bay of Danzig to the extent provided for; c) Full restoration of the security of

the harbors by harbor barriers; d) Equipping of the bases with the necessary supplies; e) Provision of the

available barrier means for use at any time for operational mine protection of the central Baltic. "153

Hitler expressed his views in this regard to the Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab on 20 August

1940, and the War Diary recorded: "3. The Führer had pointed out that the arming of the Baltic coast

with batteries was already urgent. The Navy was to make a statement as to the time and extent." 154

These defensive measures of the Seekriegsleitung formed the seaward complement to the defensive

order to the other reinforcing forces to augment the 18th Army to form Army Group B. Since the justification initially given in the introductory part of the draft text for Hitler's incorporation of the Generalgouvernement into the German Reich was deleted, since the political conditions for such a step did not yet exist or such a step was not even planned, quite plausible reasons were given for the issuance of the directive "Aufbau Ost" of 07 August 1940, as in the directive itself: "The air war with England exposes western and especially northwestern Germany to the threat of enemy air power. In order to avoid unnecessary losses, it is necessary to draw on and exploit the secured eastern territories for military purposes to a greater extent than hitherto. "Of course, the doubters immediately speak up and interpret as they see fit, because this was not allowed. Also the designation of the directive as "camouflage order" 156 is wrong, because the Russian side was officially informed by the military attaché Köstring about the stronger military occupation of the eastern area and the associated development of the infrastructure. So what was the point of camouflaging the expansion of the infrastructure that was needed for this stronger occupation? Document IIL69, Proposals of Army Group B on the Expansion of Land Fortifications East Planned in 1941, dated November 20, 1940, which is presented below, also underscores the nature of the expansion of infrastructure in the east, which was directed toward strengthening defensive capability. Remarks on the Instructions of the Army High Command of 01 September 1940 (Documents III. 73 u. 74) 1. The great haste with which the documents were prepared and implemented is striking. Thus Army Group B was instructed to hand over the area of command in the west "immediately" (Pkt. D. Details, 1.) to Army Group C and to establish liaison with the east "at an early date" through the advance commandos. 2 Although it was stipulated in Pkt 3.)a) "that Unternehmen "Seelöwe" would continue," essential landing units (1st Panzer and 31st and 32nd Infantry Divisions) earmarked for "Seelöwe" were withdrawn for redeployment to the east (Cf. Chapter III.6.), thus accepting a weakening of the forces earmarked for the landings, while at the same time stipulating that the Army troops subordinate to the divisions (Pkt. 8) were to remain in their previous locations in the west. This proves that Hitler's decision to move an additional 10 divisions to the east must have been the result of a risk assessment. 3. the information given under point E. East: 3.) to the XXXX. Armeekorps (2nd, 9th Panzer, and 13th Mot. Divisions) concerns a possible intervention in Romania and is considered in detail in Chapter III.7. This special task was cancelled again on 10 September 1940. Then, on 05 September 1940, the war diary of the OKW recorded: "LIH: Reorganization in the East: Army Group B with A OK 18, 4, and 12 = 35 divisions 24.10. Among them 6 Panzer, 3 mot.Div. (17 divisions including 1 KD +9). "180 Here, too, the High Command of the Wehrmacht evidently counted five armored and motorized rifle divisions stationed at their home bases in Central Germany and in the Ostmark, which by their location seemed suitable for rapid deployment in the East. The author believes that the military leaders in the High Command of the Wehrmacht wanted to document to Hitler a high striking power created in the East, although their deployment did not take place. Quite a number of divisions returned to their home bases, for example: the 1st East Prussian Infantry Division (to the Königsberg area), the 21st East/West Prussian Infantry Division (to the Marienburg area), the 32nd Pomeranian Infantry Division (to the Graudenz area), and two other armored divisions, the 2nd and 9th Armored Divisions likewise returned to their home bases in the Ostmark (to the Vienna/St. Pölten area). 181 The directive to move to the east was issued on 06 September 1940. The Summary on Operations Study East by Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg, 15 September 1940 This study was presented to Jodi at the Wehrmacht Joint Staff on 19 September 1940, although Warlimont doubted this date, saying it was later. 199 This study also fits into Hitler's demand that mental preparations be made. (Cf. quotation III.40.). A final assessment of the contents of Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg's study, especially to what extent the reconnaissance results of the Foreign Armies East (Document III.66), which were already available at the end of August 1940, were

used, is hardly possible, since decisive statements about the concentration of the Red Army contained in annexes and maps are not available. However, von Lossberg assumes that the "mass of the Russian Army" is in western Russia, although he acknowledges "...that a reasonably accurate picture of the enemy is difficult to obtain, especially in Russia. " Also his following statement

about the condition of the Red Army should have had an alarming effect: Quote III.84 " 1.)

Mobilization in German terms in the form of replenishing active divisions and affording reserve divisions does not seem to exist in Russia. The war army is likely to exist approximately in its framework already, although the degree of readiness and the value of the various formations are difficult to overlook. " 200 Thus, the war army should have already existed. Mind you, this operational study was made in August/September 1940, not in 1941. Germany's military attaché in Moscow, General Köstring, also confirmed on September 18, 1940, that the Red Army, thanks to its strength and material equipment, was of course capable of waging war at any time (Cf. I. Chapter. Quote L25.). Thus, by August 1940 at the latest, it was well known that Stalin, with the Red Army, had at his disposal an extraordinarily powerful and war-ready instrument for the military implementation of his policy. In the prevailing historiography it is obviously gladly overlooked that just the two facts reported by Lossberg: O the "mass of the Russian army"

is in western Russia and O "the war army should already exist in its framework,.... " form the basis of the conclusion stated in quotation III.85. Quote 111.85 "In a war against Germany, Russia has, on the whole, the following three possibilities: I.) The Russian wants to get into the forefront and for this purpose pushes into an incipient German deployment.... " 201 The possibility of this, as reported by von Lossberg, had the Red Army. All that was needed, therefore, was Stalin's instruction. However, as we know from Russian documents today, in the summer/autumn of 1940 the Red Army was not yet in a position to launch an offensive against Germany and the Wehrmacht, which had now become free in the west. Von Lossberg comments on his statement as follows: Quote III.86 ..ZuL): "It is unlikely that the Russians will dare to launch a large-scale offensive, for example against East Prussia and the northern governorate, as long as the mass of the German army is not tied up on another front in the long term. "202 But this was precisely the great danger recognized by Lossberg and not only by him. After all, Hitler had issued Instruction No. 16 for a landing in England on July 16, 1940. The formulation "...a large-scale offensive against East Prussia and the northern Generalgouvernement..."(QuoteIII.86) testifies to the fact that in the High Command of the Wehrmacht such a Russian offensive was considered possible under certain conditions, e.g. after the further fragmentation of the Wehrmacht that would occur if "Sea Lion" was carried out. However, von Lossberg considered partial actions against Finland (endangering German nickel and iron ore transports) and/or against Romania (endangering oil supplies) more likely. The following statements by von Lossberg should also have attracted attention. Quote III.87_ . "Also, according to the available news, the particularly strongly developed ground organization of the Russian air force forward of the Dnieper..." "The Russian deployment, if such a decision were made, might bear some resemblance to the present distribution of forces...." 203 Hitler's comment, made on 21 July 1940, concerning an extraordinary air threat from the Russian air force was corroborated both by the 204 statement, updated in the reconnaissance information of 09 September 1940, of 12,000 to 14,000 planes in existence and by the "... particularly strongly developed ground organization..." mentioned by Lossberg. 205 Even Lossberg's formulation of the "...present distribution of forces..." confirms that the deployment was known, even if an offensive intention on the part of the Soviet Union could only be suspected at first. 206 The second statement in Operations-Studie Ost by Lieutenant Colonel v. Lossberg also requires further consideration. 207 Quote IIL88 208 "2.) The Russian leadership is so heavy-handed the Russian railroad network in its utilization by the commandos to be considered so inadequate that any new deployment will cause great friction and take

corresponding time. " 209 With this, von Lossberg partly contradicts some statements already made in 1939 about clear and definite principles of command in the Red Army (Cf. Document II. 1.) or the assessment of the railroad system in the reconnaissance information of 09 September 1940, which had been underestimated so far. 210 Overall, however, von Lossberg considered the Soviet Union with its Red Army "such a strong military power. " 211 As evidenced by the above basic order (Document III.89) of the Army Group Command of 18 October 1940, the armies (4th, 12th, 18th Armies) of Army Group B were given the task in Pkt. I of carrying out training and expanding accommodations. 212 The tasks formulated in Pkt. II refer to the surveillance and protection of the German-Russian border and, in the event of a change in political conditions, to be ready for military border protection. These tasks are clearly defensive in nature. Even the vacationers were not to be recalled. 213 Even in the self-image of the troops, the formation of Army Group B was not considered a deployment Thus, Pt. III of the order states that timely orders for deployment will be issued should the political situation require it. 214 Summary of the reconnaissance of the danger from the east; 215 the formation of Army Group B to increase security in the east 216 Taken as a whole, these documents testify to Hitler's fears and those of the Army and Navy High Commands and demonstrate that, because of developments in the east, increased security of the sea and land borders in the direction of the east became necessary, but that preventive action in the east might also be required if the political situation changed. 217 1. the latest findings of German reconnaissance revealing a dangerous development in the east 218 The reason for the reinforcement of the securing forces in the east by the formation of Army Group B were the expansive actions of the USSR in the form of local campaigns to shift its territory westward by about 250-300 km, combined with alarming reconnaissance results of the Foreign Armies East and other reconnaissance organs about the advance of the Red Army. 219 As examples may be mentioned: 220 O the increase in the total strength of the Red Army to 151 rifle divisions, already reconnoitered in July 1940 (Document III.43) (as late as January 1939 100-108 rifle divisions, Document 11.1); 221 O the continuation of the transfer of Red Army units to the border military districts, evidenced by the reconnaissance of 116 divisions (Document III.43); 222 O the further restructuring of the armored forces to form 6 strong mechanized corps (Document III.43, 79) with the increase of the inventory from 30 to 36 mot.mech. brigades to create attack groupings (1t. Mareks mobile reserves in the inventory armored brigades, motorized and cavalry divisions, army artillery (document III. 70)), i.e., groupings intended for breakthrough into the operational depth of the enemy; 223 O the redetermination of 12,000-14,000 aircraft (document III.66) (previously 5,000) in the inventory of the Red Army Air Forces, which Mareks (document III.70) were judged to be a serious adversary, and the increase in the air threat to German centers from Red Army strategic bomber forces with a radius of action of 1,500 km; 224 O the information of Lossberg's (Document III.83) about the Red Army's war army already existing within its framework; 225 O the expectation of partial actions against Finland and Romania (Lossberg, Document III.83 and in detail Chapter III.7); 226 O and the numerical superiority of the Russian naval forces in surface ships and especially in submarines. 2 Preparatory measures in the Army based on the development of the situation in the East and information about the Red Army's buildup 227 As the few examples cited in 1 above show, the initiation of intensified security measures in the East (deployment of Army Group B) by the political and military leadership of the German Reich should no longer come as a surprise. 228 Without any doubt, there is a causal connection of the decision to increase the Army to 180 divisions as planned to the westward expansion of the Soviet Union known to all at that time, the current information of Halder about the advance of the Red Army on the basis of the conversation note of 24 July 1940 (Document III.43) as well as the information about the "Soviet Union" of the Foreign Armies East of 09 September 1940 (Document III.79), which, according to the distributor, reached many offices, including the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The assessment of

the Red Army's deployment (such as the massing in the border military districts, the air threat) made in Mareks' studies of 05 August 1940 (Document III.70) and Loßberg's of 15 September 1940 (Document III.83) also contributed to this decision when examined closely. 229 Hitler's official decree to increase the Army to now 180 divisions and to redirect armaments in the interest of rearming the Army was issued on September 28, 1940, even though there had been rumors/instructions beforehand, e.g., by Field Marshal Keitel to General Thomas on August 02, 1940 (citation HI.16) or in the Army High Command (Halder, War Diary) about the non-implementation

of the Army reductions and the reorganization of Army divisions. These must be taken as conclusions drawn by the military officers from Hitler's statements of intent during his consultation at the Berghof on 31 July 1940. 3 The preservation of the defensive mission to secure the border 230 The defensive mission of Army High Command 18 to defend the eastern border was to be preserved even after the arrival of the reinforcing forces. Thus, the order of 01 September 1940 (Document IH.73) states: "(5.) The previous directive and mission of A OK 18 to protect the eastern border against Russia will remain in effect until the arrival of Army Group B." As a precautionary measure, this order also included preventive action by the 18th Army in the event of recognized preparations for attack by the Red Army, as evidenced by the decision of the commander of Army High Command 18 (Documents I1L27,28,29). The order of Army Group B on the tasks to be solved by the units of 18 October 1940 (Document III.89) proves their defensive mission. The temporary deployment of the XXXX. Armeekorps an episode to secure the petroleum area of Ploesti 231 The provision of the XXXX Army Corps, mentioned under 3.) of the order of 01 September 1940. Army Corps, in its inventory the 2nd and 9th Armored and the 13th Motorized Divisions, for a special task corresponds to the intervention planned on August 30, 1940 (Cf. Chapter III.7.) in case of a military incursion of the Red 232 Army into Rest Romania and the threat to the petroleum area of Ploesti after receiving information about an invasion threat, i.e. a preventive measure

of the Wehrmacht, which, however, could be cancelled on September 10, 1940. 5 It was not a march of the units of Army Group B 233 That even according to the self-understanding of Army Group B it was not an incipient march of the Wehrmacht in the East, as is tirelessly asserted by the established historiography, can be seen from "Point III March" of the order of Army Group B of 18 October 1940. It says: "Should the situation make a deployment necessary, the orders for this will be issued in due time: (Document III.89). Thus, no deployment took place at all. 234 These facts presented here prove that Stalin's policy and the actions of the Red Army were causal for the strengthening of the eastern security, that these actions and intentions were certainly clarified and known by the Fremden Heere Ost and other organs, that the deployment of the Wehrmacht's units in the east during this period was intended to increase security and was defensive in character, but that in the case of recognized preparations for attack by the Red Army, readiness for preventive action was also created. 235 As Grand Admiral Raeder testified in the interrogation during the trial of the main defendants in Nuremberg, Hitler had commented to him on the transfer of Wehrmacht units to the East as follows, it was also " ...a great camouflage of his intention to land in England. " 20° 236 III.6. The Deployment of "Sea Lion" and the Connection to the Transfer of Units to the East 237 Operation "Sea Lion," the landing of the Wehrmacht in England, and further planning are not the subject of investigation in this study. Nevertheless, a brief account based on the sources is unavoidable because, according to the documents, there was a close connection between, in particular, the dropping of "Seelöwe" and the threat situation from the east. 238 In view of England's emerging unwillingness to make peace, Hitler is said to have decided as early as the beginning of July 1940 that "under certain conditions a landing in Great Britain might be a possibility. " 239 In preparation for the landing, he issued Directive No. 16, "Sea Lion," on July 16, 1940, but it was to be carried out only "if necessary." An excerpt is reproduced below. 240

Citation III.90 _____ 241 „Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber F. H. Q., den 16.7.1940 242 der Wehrmacht 243 OKW/WFA/LNr. 33 160/40 g. Kdos. Chefsache 244 Geheime Kommandosache! 7 copies 245 Chefsache Only by officer! 2nd copy 246 Instruction No. 16 247 on the preparation of a landing operation against England. 248 Since England, despite a militarily hopeless situation, has not yet shown any signs of willingness to come to an understanding, I have decided to prepare and, if necessary, dttrchiihren a landing operation against England. The purpose of this operation is to eliminate the English mainland as a base for weathering the war against Germany, and if it should become necessary, to occupy it to the full. 249 For this purpose I order the following: ... 250 (gez.) Adolf Hitler. "251 207 252 Only one day later, on July 17, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army issued his directive to prepare for the landing in England "Sea Lion" (Documents 111.91). 253 The author takes the liberty of pointing out that both in Annex 2 to the Army Commander-in-Chief's directive of 17 July 1940 and in his clarifying directive of 27 July 1940, the 31st and 32nd Infantry and the 1st Armored Division are still mentioned as landing divisions. 254 In the meeting on 31 July 1940 with Raeder, the commander in chief of the Kriegsmarine, Hitler takes 15 September 1940 as the date for the planned landing in Great Britain. The final date was to be determined after an eight-day intensified air war against Britain. 255 With this goal in mind, on 01 August 1940 he issued his Directive No. 17 (citation III.93) for the conduct of the intensified air and naval war against Britain. 256 Citation IIL93 (excerpt) 257 ... Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber Führerhauptquartier, 1 Aug 1940 258 of the Wehrmacht 259 OKWWFA/L No. 33210/40 g. Kdos. Chiefs. 260 Geheime Kommandosache 261 Chefsache 10 A usfertigungen 262 Nur durch Offizier 4. Ausfertigungen 263 Weisung Nr. 17 264 für die Führung des Luft- und Seekrieges gegen England 265 In order to create the conditions for the final defeat of England, I intend to continue the air and sea war against the English motherland in a sharper form than before. 266 For this purpose I order the following: 267 1.) ... 268 (gez.) Adolf Hitler 269 [P] Kfeitel] 270 210 271 Let us note that Hitler, by intensifying the air and sea war against the English motherland, proved that at this time he was still willing to carry out the landing "Scclöwc" despite his expression of intent on 31 July 1940. 272 A deception plan (Document III.94) for a landing in England, dated 19 August 1940 (Operation "Autumn Journey"), provided for a landing in eastern England (not on the Channel coast) and in Ireland in the second half of September 1940. 273 Proved from 30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940 (cessation of hostilities). 274 Thus, the following tasking to the 14th Army of the Leningrad Military District from the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army of November 17, 1939, on the conduct of the so-called Winter War proves the high importance attached to the Petsamo area, among others. 275 Citation III.99 276 (d) of the 14th Army.... 277 together with the Northern Fleet, to destroy the enemy's forces, to take possession of the Fisher and Sredm Peninsulas and the Petsamo area, to fortify easily in this area and to secure it from the south, not to permit the supply of live power and armament from the Norwegian port of Kirkenes, but also the dropping of landing troops on the coast of Murmansk." 278 225 279 Although the goal of the Red Army's Finnish campaign was only partially achieved, the Red Army began to develop the military infrastructure of the conquered territories and station its troops as early as the early summer of 1940. With the peace treaty of March 12, 1940, the USSR extorted further concessions from Finland beyond the occupied territories. 280 Only the strategically important ice-free port of Petsamo with the nickel ore mines in this area (the world's second largest nickel ore deposit) was returned to Finland by the Red Army after the occupation in the course of the Moscow negotiations, without declaring any interest in economic policy. Obviously, Stalin did not want to mess with Great Britain any more than absolutely necessary, since the mining rights were in British-Canadian possession. 281 After shifts in the balance of power in Europe, such as the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk (May 26, 1940), the prevention of the British landing at Narvik (June 08, 1940), the surrender of Norway (June 10, 1940), and the defeat of France

(June 22, 1940), Stalin probably believed that he could now assert with impunity his claim to Petsamo, which became known on June 23, 1940, through Molotov's demand for the surrender of the nickel ore concession. 282 That the Soviet Union was not only primarily interested in the supply of nickel ore was confirmed by Molotov to Paasikivi on June 27, 1940, who said that the Soviet Union would not be primarily interested in the supplies of nickel ore "but in the area itself and the ore there for all time to come," 226 especially since the USSR itself had considerable nickel ore deposits of its own. 283 This reference by Molotov to, "...the area itself..." confirms the great strategic importance that was attached to it for the Soviet Union, especially to the port of Petsamo for securing operations of the Northern Fleet in the North Atlantic and the North Sea. 284 The immediate start of the military expansion of the Fishermen's Peninsula, which was subsequently

USSR's demand for demilitarization of the Aaland Islands, made after the fact on June 27, 1940, the rapid military use of the leased Hanko Peninsula, large maneuvers by the Baltic Red Banner Fleet, whose naval staff had already moved to Tallinn, at the outlet of the Gulf of Finland, 227 and so on, confirmed Stalin's aggressive policy against Finland, which was directed in this way against Germany's northern flank. 285 With the Finnish assurance of July 24, 1940, that it would supply Germany with most of its nickel ore production (60 %/o), the armaments demand for nickel 228 (700-800 t/year) could be secured for years. 229 286 By demanding that Germany also receive 60% of the nickel ore production, Stalin created additional material for conflict, and by concentrating 15 divisions of the Red Army in the Leningrad Military District he considerably increased the danger of a renewed military confrontation with Finland. In that event, Germany's positions in northern Norway in the struggle against England would have been seriously jeopardized. 287 That this looming danger for Finland was not plucked out of thin air is proved by the Red Army's operational plan of 18 September 1940 (VgL the excerpt, quote IIL100.). It also proves that the Petsamo area was particularly threatened, since according to this operational plan the Red Army General Staff assumed that this area would be secured only by minor Finnish forces (4 rifle battalions). 288 Thus, one of the tasks to the northern front formulated in this operational plan was: 289 Citation III.100 290 " 4. By active actions in the north in the first days of the war, take away from Finland the port of Petsamo and close the Norwegian border in the Petsamo, Nautsi section. 291 23: 292 The plan of operations called for tasking the 14th Army of the Northern Front, in cooperation with the Northern Fleet, with the capture of the port of Petsamo and using considerable forces (3 rifle divisions (14th, 104th, 52nd) of the Leningrad Military District, 1 artillery regiment, and 4 aviation squadrons) for this purpose and for closing the border with Norway. 293 The concentration on the port of Petsamo proves that Stalin was more concerned with the strategic importance of this area for the actions of the Northern Fleet, i.e., its northern flank, and probably also with preventing the export of nickel ore to Germany. 294 In all, according to this operational plan, 46 rifle, 2 tank, and 1 motorized rifle divisions with 785 tanks and 78 aviation squadrons with 3,900 aircraft were to be deployed against Finland. 295 Although the indications (VgL above.) of expected aggressive actions of the Red Army in the direction of Finland increased also in the General Staff of the Army and the Naval Warfare Command, German reconnaissance probably did not have information about this operational plan for the so-called Continuation War of the USSR against Finland. Nor had any concentration of Red Army formations been detected at the level envisaged in the operational plan. 296 At a later date, this looming threat to Finland, and thus to the Petsamo area and nickel ore supplies to Germany, was emphatically confirmed by Molotov's demands at the talks of 12-13 November 1940 in Berlin (Cf. IV. Chapter.). 297 The reconnaissance of this threatening development in the northeast 298 Let us therefore examine to what extent and when the political and military leadership in Germany was informed of this development, what was the truth content of these reports about the growing Red Army reinforcements on the border

with Finland and also about the appearance of Red Army tank and mechanized formations, and compare the actual planning/actions of the Red Army with the reconnaissance results of the Foreign Armies East and the further reports. 299 The Allies' secret planning of actions in Scandinavia and the opening of a northern front directed against Germany became known to the political and military leadership of the German Reich at an early stage. Recall here the letter of Göring and von Ribbentrop to Mannerheim of 02 April 1940 (Document 11.36) on the Allies' secret plans of attack against Scandinavia. Through the documents of the Supreme Allied War Council found in La Charite on 19 June 1940 (citations IL9-12), also mentioned in Hitler's speech of 19 July 1940 before the Reichstag (document IIL36; citation III.37), this attack planning found its irrefutable confirmation. 300 Already with the Allied withdrawal from Norway on June 4-10, 1940, and the surrender of Norwegian troops in northern Norway on June 10, 1940, the Finnish government observed the military expansion of the now Soviet Fischer Peninsula and feared the forcible seizure of the Petsamo area by the Red Army as well as the Norwegian province of Finnmark, which was still secured by Norwegian border troops. According to several communications of Finnish military authorities, Finland tried to save the occupation of this area by German troops from a feared Soviet seizure. The High Command of the Wehrmacht did not comply with the Finnish request for German support, since this advance by the Wehrmacht could have been misconstrued as an anti-Soviet measure. 231 301 In particular, the naval warfare command received very early information about the Soviet Union's further advance to establish military bases in the occupied Finnish territories as the Soviet Union's northern flank. As evidence, excerpts from the following messages from the entries in the war diary of the Seekriegsleitung should be mentioned: 302 13 June 1940, "Russia: fortification Fischer peninsula thereby possibility domination Petsamo port." 232 303 July 03, 1940, "Aaland question: Russian government had let Finnish government know that Soviet-Russian-Finnish economic treaty could not be signed by Russia unless Aaland question was settled." 233 304 But reports to this effect were also received on other lines. Thus, on July 11, 1940, the German military attaché in Moscow, General Köstring, reported in his report to Herr von Toppelskirch on his doubts concerning the reason for stationing 15 divisions of the Red Army on the border with Finland. "I wonder why the Russians are so anxious to leave about 15 div. there, "and further about the increasing Soviet attacks against Finland: "What will become of Finland? Every day almost a newspaper spits on them (on the Finns the author). "234 305 Reports from the Foreign Armies East also confirmed early on the buildup of Russian formations, whose further military advance could have extremely unpleasant consequences for Germany and for the struggle against England in the event of a renewed military conflict with Finland. 306 A juxtaposition is made in the following Table 111.101: 307 As can be seen in Table 111.101, the Foreign Armies East were alerted early (on 24 July 1940) to the stationing of 15 divisions on the borders of Finland, although the appearance of Red Army armored units in this area could not be ascertained until after the Estonian General Staff reported in mid-August 1940 (Document III.79). 308 The arrival of further Red Army reinforcements in the Leningrad Military District to more than 19 divisions, including 4 motorized rifle divisions, could also be elucidated. 309 Not only the memo of conversation from the Foreign Armies East for Halder of 24 July 1940 (Document IH.43) but also a whole series of reports available to the High Commands of the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht components, excerpts of which are given below, prove that the German political and military leadership was fully informed about this development in the northeast, which threatened above all German interests. 310 07 August 1940, "Finland: Increase in Tensions with Russia. Impending sharp demands by Soviet Russia are expected in Finland. " 241 311 09 August 1940, "Finland: Envoy in Kovno reports action allegedly planned by Russia against Finland before the end of August. Russian troops to be on alert at Finnish border Aug. 15. " 242 312 12 August 1940, "Whole series of embassy, attache, V-man messages about reinforcement of the 15 Russian divisions standing on the Finnish border by enclosure of

tanks. From 15.8. alarm of these troops to be expected. " 243 313 On the same day Ausland/Abwehr reported to the Wehrmacht Joint Staff that the 15 Red Army divisions standing on the border had been reinforced by tank units. 244 314 14 August 1940, „d) Finland: rumors of new demands by Russia on Finland, "c 245 315 14 August 1940, "In Finnish military circles are expecting an early start of a Russian offensive against Finland in view of alleged continued military transports to the Karelian Isthmus. " 246 316 The establishment of Red Army operational readiness was expected by 15 August 1940. 317 And on 15 August 1940 Military Attache Köstring wrote to Herr von Toppelskirch: "M. E. relations remain tense, which I infer from the removal of further divisions to the Finnish border. The information varies between 5-20 divisions. " 247 318 August 16, 1940, "Russian-Finnish tension apparently eased. No notable Russian reinforcements on Finnish border. " 248 319 An entry in the war diary.

of the Seekriegsleitung for 17 August 1940 illuminates the precarious situation in northern Scandinavia. 320 _... Apparently the Finnish Government hopes to be able to hold off an imminent Russian action by making far-reaching concessions to Russia. The General Staff gives the following verdict on Finnish military strength: Finnish Army present strength 15 divisions and 130,000 men, replenishment to total war strength 300,000 men possible. Armament insufficient, great shortage of ammunition, aviation insignificant.... After initial fierce resistance, collapse expected soon. " 321 249 322 This entry confirms that the military leadership had recognized the magnitude of the danger threatening Finland, but at the same time the helplessness to preserve Finland without German military help. 323 As in the War Diary of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht on August 25, 1940, with the entry "Former Finnish Military Attache in Oslo visited Generaloberst von Falkenhorst to sound out German attitude in case of renewed attack. The Finnish side tried to clarify Germany's position, which was by no means clear, in the event of renewed aggressive action by the Soviet Union against Finland. 250 324 And on September 2, 1940, the OKW received a message about 15-20 divisions on the Russian side and the further expansion of the railroad system. 251 325 These and other reports of growing Soviet activity against Finland, some of which came from Finnish radio reconnaissance 202, threatened not only nickel ore shipments from Petsamo but also ore shipments from Kiruna, Sweden, most of which came by ship across the Gulf of Bothnia. This was a danger also recognized by Mareks in his Operation Draft East of 05 August 1940 (Document III.70). 326 There were also reports of the undermining by the Soviet Union of Germany's blockade efforts against England and of the consequent intensification of commercial warfare in the North Sea. 327 The above-mentioned reports of the expansion of the Fishermen's Peninsula fortifications, the stationing of naval infantry and air forces, the expansion of naval bases on the Barents Sea and the White Sea, and the strengthening of the North Sea Fleet to 10 destroyers and 40 submarines testified to the Soviet Union's intention to have a military presence in the North Atlantic and North Sea and created the possibility of seriously jeopardizing the supply of the Wehrmacht's troops in northern Norway and their positions in the struggle against England. 328 This action of the Soviet Union could only be evaluated in the high commands of the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht components as a progressive military expansion of the northern flank of the Soviet Union and as an increasing endangerment of the positions in northern Scandinavia necessary for the fight against

England. 329 The Wehrmacht's Securing Measures in Northern Norway 330 Despite the increasing danger to Finland, Hitler did not initially take sides with Finland in order to avoid straining German-Russian relations. In his Reichstag speech of July 19, 1940, Hitler still expressed his adherence to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939. For the time being, he refused to supply weapons to Finland and, despite a Finnish request, declared himself unwilling to participate in the control of the demilitarization of the Åland Islands demanded by the USSR so as not to worsen the strategic situation in the Baltic region. 253 331 Despite Hitler's adherence to this publicly stated intention, he could not

avoid taking note of those reports that seemed to seriously threaten Germany's position in Scandinavia and that of the Wehrmacht in northern Norway. Ueberschär writes about this: 332 Quote III.103 333 "Intelligence reports received in large numbers from mid-July 1940 reinforced the impression in Hitler's mind and in the OKW that the Soviet leadership intended a violent coup against Finland similar to the one shortly before in the Baltic States when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were annexed. " 334 254 335 In view of these developments that had become known, it should not come as a surprise that Hitler, on July 21, 1940, before the supreme commanders of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, set forth his first thoughts about a war against the Soviet Union, which had set the causes for this development, possibly becoming necessary, and expressed his views on possible directions of operations ("operational trajectories: Baltic, Finland-Ukraine"^^). 336 Although these findings did not yet lead to a reorientation of German policy toward Finland, some safeguards against Russian ambitions in Finland were nevertheless deemed necessary. Before initiating them, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Guidance Office on 09 August 1940 again asked for more detailed information about the alleged Russian troop buildups on the Finnish border. 256 337 July 31, 1940, Consultation with Hitler 338 The following formulation used by Hitler at this consultation cannot be left without establishing the causal connections with the events that had previously taken place in the Baltic region: 339 but certain decision to finish off Russia. Necessary also because of the situation on the Baltic Sea. 2 Great state [Russia] not useful on Baltic Sea. "2 340 After all, it was Stalin who, in the run-up to Hitler's July 31, 1940, briefing in the area of the eastern Baltic, indicated his strategic interest in the northern flank through the annexation of the Baltic states, the transfer of large parts of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet to Tallinn, the military expansion of the Hanko Peninsula, and the occupation of the Åland Islands. 341 At any rate, Hitler's following remark, "To what extent Finland and Turkey are of interest, we shall see, "258 proves that at that time the inclusion of Finland in a possible military confrontation with the Soviet Union was by no means decided. Let us take this as a further indication that Hitler's statement was not yet a decision but an expression of intent. 342 In July/August 1940, 7 divisions of the Wehrmacht (the formation of another division did not materialize) were stationed in Norway, distributed throughout the country.259 343 Because of the worsening situation between Germany and Soviet Russia, Hitler expressed the following wish at a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy attended by Keitel and Jodi on August 13, 1940, "...a stronger development of the northern Norwegian area, especially the stronger fortification of the fjords there, mainly at the road crossings, so that Soviet Russian attacks there would be hopeless and a basis for an occupation of Petsamo would be created.".260 344 While securing the road network seems expedient from the point of view of a possible anticipatory occupation of Petsamo, the demand for the fortification of the fjords suggests that Hitler anticipated a Soviet advance into the North Atlantic. 345 In accordance with this desire, on 17 August 1940 the Seekriegsleitung provided for the transfer of the center of gravity of coastal defense in northern Norway from Kristiansund-South to Tromsø, combined with the formation of the new command authority "Commander of Sea Defense Tromsø." 261 346 Also, on 20 August 1940 (i.e., after receiving reports on many channels and also from the Foreign Armies East) and the above findings of a developing threat situation against Finland, Hitler expressed the desire (Cf. citation IIL104.) to move another mountain division to northern Norway to reinforce the weak forces, especially since Petsamo was almost coverless, since nearly all 347 available divisions of the Finnish Army were concentrated in the area of Lake Ladoga against an expected attack by the Red Army. 348 The war diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht records the following: 349 Quote III.104 350 "1. The Fuehrer would like to have a Geb. Div. moved again to the area around Drontheim in place of the 2nd Geb. Div. It had been reported to him that transport space for this would only be available in the event of the failure of the "Seelöwe" enterprise. " 351 262 352 This plan failed due to the lack of transport facilities held in readiness for "Seelöwe." 353 The

possible rather modest measures to increase the defensive capability and to possibly intervene to secure the area around Petsamo can be taken from the following further quotations from the war diaries. 354 23 August 1940, "Proposal ChefL: Refit 196th Division as Mountain Division, in transport to Drontheim. Force breakdown of XXI SS Brigade, parts Kirkenes, mass Oslo. Fuehrer intends to place another SS T-Standarte in Norway. Posture of Norwegians stiffening. " 263 355 26 August 1940, "Norway: Mountain Equipment for 196th Div (Drontheim). Raising a new division from the four divisions of southern Norway. " 356 "Finland is to receive weapons and aircraft from us; if Russia attacks the Finns, we intend to occupy Petsamo. 357 Only after further development of the danger looming for German troops in northern Norway did Hitler change the attitude toward Finland adopted by Germany in October 1939 for reasons of partnership with the Soviet Union, lifting the arms embargo imposed and permitting increased arms shipments to Finland on 26 August 1940. 358 On August 26, 1940, Hitler outlined to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch his intention to occupy Petsamo if the Soviet Union attacked Finland. 265 359 In a directive from the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht to the Army High Command dated 21 August 1940, referring to a decision of Hitler of 26 August 1940 (citation III.105), it was instructed: 360 "2nd Group XXL 361 Since a Geb.Div. is not available at present, Ob.d.H. is requested to examine whether, in a procedure similar to that used for new formations in the homeland, another division cannot be formed from the divisions in Norway and, if possible, provided with Geb.-equipment. " 362 266 363 About this instruction received on August 27, 1940, Halder formulated in the war diary, "...One wants to be ready in the north (Petsamo) if the Russian attacks Finland. " while at the same time complaining of a lack of clear tasking. 267 364 The Planning of Operation "Reindeer. " 365 To accomplish this task, the Wehrmacht, in the absence of an influx of reinforcements, planned to reorganize the forces standing in Norway, by deploying task forces from units deployed in northern Norway as an intervention force to militarily occupy the Petsamo area in the event of Soviet aggression against Finland. 366 A rapid movement and operational capability of Colonel General von Falkenhorst's Mountain Corps in northern Norway was to be ensured by moving the corps to the area around Kirkenes. 367 To secure the Petsamo area from Russian attack in the event of renewed aggression, the Norway Mountain Corps was moved to the Narvik-Kirkenes area and the "Renntier" enterprise was planned. 368 On 07 September 40, General Dietl, commander of the Mountain Corps (in the inventory the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions and, at times, the 181st Infantry Division), issued the order (Document III.106) concerning the possible use of the corps to carry out the "Renntier" enterprise. 369 In addition, parts of an SS brigade stationed in Oslo were transferred to Kirkenes.